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What’s the relationship between: 
 
(i) Intending to do something, 
(ii) Believing that you are going to do this, and 
(iii) Its being the case that you are going to do the thing in question? 
 
A natural answer to give is that while these three categories often coincide, the reality of 
each doesn’t depend on either of the others. A person might, for example, intend to stop 
by the bookstore on the way home from work but not believe that she’s going to do it (see 
Bratman 1999, p. 37): this would be an example of (i) without (ii); and if we imagine 
instead that the person believes she is going to skip the bookstore, despite not intending to 
do so, then we’d have a case of (ii) without (i) instead. A person can intend to do, or 
believe that she’s going to do, something that’s actually quite impossible for her, like 
square a circle or travel faster than the speed of light: this would give us (i) or (ii) without 
(iii). And, finally, things might be such that a person is going to do a certain thing—step 
on a snake, say, or have another cigarette—but without any idea of this, or without any 
resolve that it happen: the former case gives us (iii) without (ii), and the latter gives us 
(iii) without (i). The prospects for aligning our categories do not appear very promising. 
 Despite these appearances, several philosophers have recently developed accounts 
of future-directed intention according to which some of these categories coincide after 
all. For example, in a recent paper Berislav Marušić and I made a case for strong 
cognitivism about intention, according to which ‘To intend to do something is neither 
more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it’ 
(Marušić and Schwenkler 2018, p. 309). And Philip Clark (2020) has recently proposed a 
view on which intention is identified with the ‘conative state’ that he calls ‘being going to 
do’ the thing that one intends (Clark 2020, p. 316). Clark’s position identifies (i) above 
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with (iii) and denies that they are identical with (ii), while Marušić and I identified (i) 
with (ii) without taking any direct stance on the relationship of these to (iii). In this paper, 
I propose a position on which all three categories, correctly understood, amount in the 
fundamental case to the very same thing. 
 Here is how I will proceed. Section II summarizes the case for strong cognitivism 
and presents Clark’s main objections to it. Sections III and IV evaluate Clark’s case for 
noninferential weak cognitivism, first offering a friendly amendment to it and then 
raising an important objection. Section V then defends the cognitivist identification of 
intention with belief while also arguing that, in the conceptually central case, the belief 
that you are going to do something, when grounded in your practical reasoning, makes 





In our paper, Marušić and I offered three main arguments in defense of the identification 
of intention with belief.1 
First, we argued that this position best explains why beliefs about one’s future 
actions should be transparent to practical reasoning. If asked whether I’ll speak at a 
conference next February, I will address this question through reasoning that considers 
the pros and cons of doing so, rather than reasoning that considers evidence for and 
against the judgment that I’ll do this. And if I reason, ‘The conference will be in a nice 
location and on an interesting topic; my schedule is free and the trip won’t inconvenience 
my family; so I’ll go’, then my belief that I’ll go seems to be arrived at through the same 
reasoning by which I arrive at the intention to do this.2 This phenomenon is easy to 
account for on a view according to which belief and intention are one and the same. 
Second, Marušić and I observed that the usual way to express one’s future-
directed intentions is through a statement that describes what one will do, or what one is 
going to do. For example, if I tell you that I’m going to be there for your conference in 
February, then usually I’ll thereby have expressed the intention to do this. (Only 
‘usually’: because I might anticipate being brought there by force.) This statement is no 
less a way to express the belief that I am going to be at the conference. And an easy way 
to explain why the very same statement can express both the intention to do something 
and the belief that one will do it is by appeal to the hypothesis that intention is identical to 
belief. 
Finally, Marušić and I argued that the cognitivist account of intention is supported 
by the role that intentions play in planning behavior. If I intend to go to the conference in 
	
1 For these arguments see Marušić and Schwenkler (2018), pp. 316-321. 
2 For more on how to understand this form of reasoning, see Schwenkler (forthcoming). 
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February then I’ll make the necessary travel arrangements, book a hotel room, keep those 
days otherwise free on my calendar, and so on. All this behavior makes sense only on the 
assumption that I believe I am going to be there: for otherwise, why would I book a hotel 
room and make hotel reservations in that city rather than somewhere else? And the thesis 
of strong cognitivism makes good sense of why intention would play this belief-like role 
in planning. 
Two points of clarification are in order. First, on Marušić and my view intentions 
are different from other beliefs in being distinctively ‘practical’: they are part of an 
agent’s view of her future insofar as she means to create the truth that she envisions, 
which is why they do not have to reflect evidence about what is anyway going to happen. 
This aspect of our position is supposed to account for the possibility of believing you will 
do something without thereby intending to do it. If, for example, my belief that I am 
going to forget to stop by the bookstore is what Anscombe (1963, p. 2) calls an ‘estimate 
of my chances’, i.e., a belief based on evidence about my usual tendency to forget things, 
then it is not a practical belief and so not, on our view, an intention. That is why it is 
possible to hold this belief without thereby intending not to stop. Second, we also hold 
that intentions, like many of our other beliefs, often have an implicitly conditional 
character that’s not always expressed in our stated descriptions of what we are going to 
do. For example, the intention I’d express by saying ‘I’m going to stop by the bookstore 
this evening’ is not an intention to do this no matter what: for example, I surely don’t 
intend to do this even if I need to rush home because my house is on fire. And we appeal 
to this idea to explain why it’s possible to intend to do something despite being unsure of 
whether you actually will actually do it. I might, for example, intend to speak at the 
conference that you’ve invited me to, but not be able to rule out the possibility that I’ll 
have to stay home to care for a sick child or skip the trip because the airlines have been 
shut down due to a global pandemic. (A rare case where life keeps up with the 
philosophical imagination.) In this case, the belief with which Marušić and I would 
identify my intention to speak at the conference is the belief that I’ll do this if the airlines 
are operating and unless I need to care for a sick child. And it’s plausible that my 
intention to speak has this same conditional content. 
Significantly, all the cognitivist arguments summarized above have the form of an 
inference to the best explanation. This means that none of them even purports to show 
that intention must be identical to belief: Marušić and I argued instead that in each case 
‘the best—because most elegant, intuitive, and unforced—explanation of the phenomena’ 
in question is that intention is identical to belief, and that our cognitivist position ‘should 
be favored for that reason’ (Marušić and Schwenkler 2018, p. 317). This argumentative 
strategy means, however, that making a successful case against strong cognitivism 
doesn’t require refuting any of these three arguments. Each could be perfectly good as it 
stands, and we would still have sufficient reason to adopt a different explanation of these 
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phenomena if we were shown on some other grounds that strong cognitivism should be 
rejected. That is what Clark aims to do in his paper. 
Clark (2020) argues in two ways that intentions are not identical to beliefs about 
what one will do. The first argument is that intentions ‘are not shown to have been true or 
false by what you go on to do’: 
 
If you prefer sleeping in the parlor to sleeping in the attic, and wind up sleeping in 
the attic, your preference for sleeping in the parlor is not thereby shown to have 
been false. Similarly, if you intend to sleep in the parlor, and wind up sleeping in 
the attic, your intention is not thereby shown to have been false. By contrast, if 
you think you will sleep in the parlor, and wind up sleeping in the attic, your 
thought is thereby shown to have been false. On the face of it, intentions to φ fall 
in with desires to φ and preferences for φ-ing, rather than with thoughts and 
beliefs that you will φ. (Clark 2020, p. 309) 
 
I find this argument less than convincing. While it’s true that statements like ‘Your 
intention is false’ or ‘So-and-so falsely intended …’ aren’t part of ordinary English 
parlance, the cognitivist can give a pragmatic explanation of this by appeal to the fact that 
intentions, and the statements that express them, aren’t supposed to be grounded in 
evidence for their truth. As Anscombe (1963, p. 55) observes, if I say, for example, that 
‘(I think) I am going to go to bed at midnight’, the way for you to contradict my 
statement is not by saying ‘You won’t, for your never keep such resolutions’, but rather 
by saying something like ‘You won’t, for I am going to stop you’.3 On the face of it, 
saying this last thing is a way of saying that my belief that I was going to go to bed at 
midnight was false, but not by providing evidence against it—which is what explicit talk 
of truth and falsity would seem to make the issue. 
Another problem with Clark’s argument is that even if though sounds strange to 
call intentions themselves true or false, the same isn’t true of the agents who intend things 
or the statements by which intentions are expressed. If I decide (that I’m going) to do 
something which then I don’t do, then it’s quite natural to say that I was mistaken in 
thinking that I’d do this, and if I had told you that I’d do it then it would be appropriate to 
complain that what I said was false.4 Yet what I said is nothing more than what I 
intended—viz., to do what I said I’d do. As Anscombe puts it in a related context, why 
	
3 For interpretation of this difficult passage, see Schwenkler (2019), pp. 106-113. 
4 Indeed, consider Clark’s own definition of belief: ‘To believe that p is to represent p as true, and to do so 
in such a way that if it is not the case that p, one is thereby shown to be in error about whether p’ (2020, p. 
311). Here it is the believer, and not the belief itself, that is described as the locus of error or correctness. 
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should we think there is more than ‘a dispensable usage’ reflected in the fact that we 
don’t call intentions true or false according as they are executed or not?5 
 Clark’s other objection to strong cognitivism is much more pressing, however. 
The idea behind it is one that I alluded to earlier, namely that it seems possible to believe 
you are going to do something that you want to do, or think you ought to do, without 
actually intending to do the thing in question. Clark finds a version of this idea in Harry 
Frankfurt’s writings: 
 
a person may attempt to resolve his ambivalence by deciding to adhere 
unequivocally to one of his alternatives rather than the other; and he may believe 
that in thus making up his mind he has eliminated the division of his will and 
become wholehearted. Whether such changes have actually occurred, however, is 
another matter. When the chips are down he may discover that he is not, after all, 
decisively moved by the preference or motive he supposed he had adopted 
(Frankfurt 1998, p. 101; cited in Clark 2020, p. 312). 
 
Clark takes Frankfurt’s remark to support the anti-cognitivist conclusion that believing 
that one will do something, even where this belief is of the distinctively practical variety, 
is insufficient for intending to do it. The state of intention requires that a person’s will is, 
if not entirely undivided, at least decisively on the side of doing the thing in question. 
And it seems to be possible to believe that you are so decided that you are going do the 
thing you have decided on, when in fact this just isn’t true: you aren’t going to do it, and 
looking back we will be able to say that you never were going to do it at all. Intention 
requires something more than a mere belief about what one is going to do. 
I’m going to put my reply to this objection on hold until the final section of this 
paper. For now I want to emphasize one thing that the objection doesn’t depend on, since 
this will bring out a distinction that’s going to be all-important in what follows. It’s 
central to Clark’s position, and to any adequate account of future-directed intention, that 
the question of what a person intends not be conflated with the question of what they 
actually go on to do. Even Anscombe, who holds that the expression and description of 
intention are ways of saying what is happening or is going to happen, also insists that it’s 
possible to intend to do what one never actually does: 
 
a man can form an intention which he then does nothing to carry out, either 
because he is prevented or because he changes his mind: but the intention itself 
can be complete, though it remains a purely interior thing. (Anscombe 1963, p. 9) 
 
	
5 Here is Anscombe’s remark in its full context: ‘Execution-conditions for commands correspond to truth-
conditions for propositions. What are the reasons other than a dispensable usage for not calling commands 
true or false according as they are obeyed or disobeyed?’ (1963, p. 3). 
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It is this phenomenon, that of ‘intention for the future’, that is the subject of the present 
discussion, and while all parties to the conversation agree with Anscombe that this topic 
isn’t separable from that of ‘what physically takes place, i.e. what a man actually does’ 
(Anscombe 1963, p. 9) in carrying out his intentions, we all agree on this as well: that a 
person can intend, in a full-blown and totally unqualified way, to do what he does not 
ever end up doing. That is, we all agree that a person may have been, in Frankfurt’s 
phrase, ‘decisively moved’ to do something, even if he never executed this decision for 
one reason or another. Below I’ll explore Clark’s attempt to account for this possibility, 






Clark’s alternative to strong cognitivism centers on the idea that to intend to do 
something requires that one be going to do it, in a sense of the italicized phrase that 
allows that a person can have been going to do something that she actually didn’t do at 
all. Examples abound: ‘I was going to buy a Ford, but then I saw that the Chevrolet 
dealership was having a sale’; ‘I was going to pick up some milk at the store, but then I 
forgot’; ‘I was going to travel to the beach, but it turned out that the bridge to get there 
was closed for repairs’. Nor is this phenomenon limited to intentional action. One might 
say, for example, that a branch was going to fall on her house (but then it was taken 
down), that a car’s brakes were going to fail (if she hadn’t gone into the shop in time), 
that it was going to rain (and then the wind suddenly changed direction). In all these 
cases, we describe a past tendency that turned out not to be realized. (The way I’m using 
‘tendency’ here and in what follows is supposed to express the very same concept as 
Clark’s ‘being going to’.6) And Clark’s proposal is that intention consists partly in just 
such a tendency. On his view, to intend to do something requires that one be going to do 
it—and the reality of such a tendency isn’t guaranteed by the presence of a belief about 
what one is going to do. 
	
6 This use of ‘tendency’ is admittedly somewhat technical. Ordinarily, when I say, e.g., that I have a 
tendency to forget things (as in my discussion above of Anscombe on making an ‘estimate of my chances’), 
I am attributing to myself a general or standing tendency to do this, rather than making a claim about what I 
right now am going to do. Indeed, in this ordinary sense of ‘tendency’ I can (right now) have a tendency to 
do something that I am (right now) not going to do at all: for example, I might usually forget my keys when 
I leave for the office, though I’ve really made quite sure that I won’t do so on this particular occasion. 
Likewise, I can (right now) be going to do something that I don’t have any general tendency to do: for 
example, perhaps I’m going to make that once-in-a-lifetime visit to Paris in June. (If only.) Still, I’m going 
to use ‘tendency’ in this somewhat artificial way just because I find it to provide a less awkward way to 
describe my topic than with Clark’s phrase ‘being going to’. (I thank Phil Clark for helpful comments that 
prompted this footnote.) 
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Of course, the mere fact that someone is (or was) going to do a certain thing 
doesn’t mean that she has (or had) formed an intention to do it. Something more than a 
sheer tendency is required, and Clark argues that the further ingredient is the practical or 
‘directive’ belief that Marušić and I identified with intention: 
 
Suppose, for example, that you are Maggie Fitzgerald, the fictional prizefighter, 
heading into the ring. In previous bouts with this opponent, you’ve never lasted a 
full three rounds. Given your track record, you judge that you will go down in the 
third round. Alternatively, imagine that a gambler has offered you money to lose 
in the third round. Given the advantages of doing so, you decide that you will go 
down in the third round. (Clark 2020, pp. 318-319) 
 
Clark wants us to suppose that in both of these cases, Maggie is indeed going to go down 
in the third round. And his proposal is that in the case where Maggie intends to go down 
in the third round she must also believe that she is going to this, and this belief must be a 
directive attitude that is grounded in reasoning that Maggie takes to show doing this to be 
somehow worthwhile. Clark uses the example of being a planet to illustrate how he 
understands the relationship between a person’s intentions and her directive beliefs: 
 
It follows from the fact that something is a planet that it orbits a star. But the 
planet itself is just the object that orbits the star. Its being a planet requires the 
presence of the star, but the star and the planet are distinct. Indeed, the star is not 
even part of the planet. Analogously, while intending to do something does entail 
thinking you will do it, the intention itself is not a thought about what you will do. 
It is not identical to the thought, nor does it have the thought as a proper part. 
(Clark 2020, p. 309) 
 
Clark’s idea, then, is that what I have called one’s ‘tendencies’, or what Clark calls one’s 
‘being going to do’ certain things, are to directive beliefs about what one will do as 
planets are to stars, and that we should identify intentions with these tendencies rather 
than with directive beliefs. This position avoids the difficulties that I discussed in the 
preceding section while also accounting for the appearances that Marušić and I used to 
motivate strong cognitivism: it explains the close connection between a person’s 
intentions and her view of her own future while allowing for the possibility of self-
deception and eschewing the admittedly unnatural construal of intentions as propositional 
attitudes that can be true or false. 
But it is tricky to get the details of this position just right. Suppose, for example, 
that Maggie the prizefighter has formed a directive belief that she’ll go down in the third 
round, but in fact she isn’t ‘decisively moved’ by this conviction: she’s scared of 
throwing the fight, and when the third round comes she won’t have the nerve to take a 
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fall. And now suppose further that Maggie is going to go down in the third round 
nonetheless, since she simply isn’t a good enough fighter to stay on her feet. In this case 
Maggie seems to satisfy the two conditions on intending that are discussed just above: 
she is going to go down in the third round, and she has a directive belief that she’s going 
to do this. Nevertheless, at least if the Frankfurtian objection discussed in the preceding 
section holds up, Maggie doesn’t really intend to do this. Something more is needed. 
The solution seems obvious. What’s necessary for Maggie to count as intending 
to go down in the third round is for the reasons behind her directive belief to be the 
reasons that ground her tendency—i.e., that make it the case that she is going to do this. 
In the case we just imagined, Maggie is going to go down, not because she’s been offered 
money to lose, but because she just isn’t a good enough fighter. By contrast, in Clark’s 
original case the reasons why Maggie is going to go down are the same as the reasons 
why she has decided to do this.  
Yet even that is not quite sufficient. Imagine, for example, that thinking about 
why she’s accepted the bribe is going to make Maggie very nervous, which means she 
will fight poorly and go down in the third round, even though this isn’t something that 
she (really) intends to do. (A familiar-sounding example of a ‘deviant causal chain’.) To 
get around this, we must suppose that Maggie’s own thought about what she is going to 
do and why is itself the ground of her tendency to do this, and that this fact is no accident. 
(By analogy: being a planet requires not just the existence of a nearby star, but also that 
the orbiting relation hold between the two things.7) Maggie’s intention, which according 
to Clark is identical to her tendency to go down, must be grounded in the practical 





We are considering the possibility that intention is not merely a practical or directive 
belief, but rather what I will call a self-conscious practical tendency toward doing a 
certain thing. (‘Self-conscious’ because of its intimate relation to directive belief, 
‘practical’ because it is grounded in practical reasoning.) According to this position, a 
person doesn’t intend to do something unless she really is going to do it. However, the 
mere fact that someone is going to do something, even if she has a directive, non-
observational belief that she will do this, doesn’t suffice for intention either. What 
distinguishes an intention from other sorts of tendency is that it is a tendency grounded in 
the reasoning by which a person decides what she will do. 
What reasons are there to favor this position over the cognitivist one, or vice 
versa? We have already considered one argument in favor of Clark’s position: that it 
	
7 I thank Phil Clark for pointing out the relevance of this analogy to the point I am making here. 
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seems possible for a person’s beliefs and her intentions to come apart, since you might 
believe that you are going to do something without really having committed yourself to 
doing it. But there is a different sort of case that cuts in the opposite direction. (I thank 
Marshall Bierson for showing this to me.) Suppose you’ve decided to go to the beach, 
and the only way there is by driving over a bridge that, unbeknownst to you, has long 
been closed for repairs. In this case there seems to be no question of whether you intend 
to go to the beach: your will isn’t in any way conflicted, and you’ve made up your mind 
that this is what you are going to do. But are you going to go there? It is hard to see how 
this could be. After all, the way to the beach is closed, and so not only won’t you go there 
(at least this time), but there will also be a sense in which you never were going to go, 
since doing this was never a possibility for you. Such a case suggests that Clark’s demand 
that intention involve a real tendency is simply too strong. 
I can think of two ways to respond to this objection. One is to bite the bullet and 
say that in the case I’ve just described, you really are going to go to the beach despite the 
fact that the bridge that you need to get there was closed.8 There is something to this: 
after all, in a case like this you can certainly say, after the fact, ‘I was going to go to the 
beach—except that the bridge turned out to be closed’, and it seems appropriate enough 
for me to say the same about you. But this reply only works in the backward-looking 
case. If you’ve made up your mind to go to the beach but the bridge that you need to get 
there is closed, then while you will say, in your ignorance, that you are going to go to the 
beach, I cannot say the same of you if I know what I do about the bridge. (Nor is this only 
a matter of conversational implicature. For I also cannot say, ‘NN is going to go to the 
beach—though by this I don’t mean that she will go there, since in fact the only bridge 
from the mainland is closed.’) In this case, the most that I can say is that you think you 
are going to do this, or that this is what you intend to do. Knowing that you have no way 
to get to the beach, I cannot seriously say that you are going to go there. 
	
8 I think that this is how Clark himself would respond. He writes in an endnote that it is important to 
‘distinguish the relevant notion of being going to from the idea that some event is imminent, or in the offing’, 
and illustrates this with a twist on the case of Anna Karenina in which ‘she was going to continue her affair 
with V’ but in fact V has been killed in a duel. According to Clark, ‘It remains true, in this case, that Anna 
was going to continue the affair, even though no such event was imminent. This was the direction in which 
she was headed … The sense in which Anna was going to continue the affair, in this case, is not that this was 
imminent’ (Clark 2020, p. 325 n.7). My response to this is twofold. First, as I say in the main text to which 
the present note is appended, this reply works only in the backward-looking case: if I am one of Anna’s 
contemporaries and I know that V has been killed in a duel, I will not say of Anna that she is going to continue 
her affair with V. Second, the appeal to events that are going to happen without being ‘imminent’ doesn’t 
help Clark’s case either, since ordinary talk of ‘imminence’ just has to do with what is going to happen soon. 
(Saying that my death is not imminent doesn’t call into question whether I will die, and saying that 
something—a terrorist attack, for example—was going to happen ‘imminently’ doesn’t entail anything about 
whether it did; indeed, the usual implication is to the contrary.) The question remains whether there is any 
good sense of ‘to be going to’ in which a person can be said to be going to do something which we know that 
she is not going to do. 
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Another response, which appears at first to be more promising, turns on an idea 
that Marušić and I developed in our paper and that I touched on briefly in Section II, 
namely that the content of our intentions is usually conditional in certain respects that are 
often left implicit when we express them. Building on earlier work by Luca Ferrero 
(2009), Marušić and I (2018, pp. 322-328) identified two ways in which conditions can 
enter into the content of an intention: a ‘precondition’ describes a condition that must be 
satisfied in order for one to be able to act in a given way, and a ‘restrictive condition’ 
describes a condition under which one would decide to do something else. Thus, for 
example, the intention that you might express by saying ‘I am going to go to the beach’ 
will usually have as a precondition that there is a way for you to drive there, and as a 
restrictive condition that you’re not in the midst of a hurricane. Applied to the present 
objection, then, the idea would be that this conditionality also exists at the level of our 
practical tendencies. For example, in the case where the bridge to the beach happens to be 
closed, though it won’t be true that you are going to go to the beach simpliciter, perhaps 
you are nevertheless going to: go if the bridge is open. This conditional description of a 
practical tendency can remain in place even if one of the enabling conditions for the 
action in question is not satisfied. 
I said that this response appears more promising than the first one. But I don’t 
believe it succeeds, for two reasons. First, in the case just described if I know that the 
bridge won’t be open on the day you are planning on going to the beach, then I still 
cannot really say of you, ‘NN is going to go to the beach if the bridge is open’, but only 
that this is what you would be going to do if it were. And that is something I could also 
say in a very different sort of case, in which you had learned about the closure and 
decided against the trip. However, in the case at issue your intention isn’t hypothetical or 
counterfactual—its content is, but not the fact of your having it. 
This last observation reveals an important difference between the way we use the 
phrase ‘going to φ if …’ to express or attribute a conditional intention, and the way we 
use this same phrase to attribute what we might call ‘natural’ tendencies, like the one we 
describe in saying that a tree is going to fall over. If, for example, you say of a storm-
damaged tree that ‘It is going to fall on the house if we have another very bad storm’, 
then the condition you describe is external to the tendency in question: you are saying 
that if a certain thing happens, then the tree is going to fall. That is, in these cases the 
phrase ‘going to φ’ is included within the scope of the conditional, and so the sentence 
describes something that might be going to happen, but isn’t going to happen as of now.9 
The conditional character of an intention is different from this, however, in that it is 
internal to the tendency itself. Thus, for example, if you’ve made up your mind to go to 
the beach on the condition that the weather is sunny, then in saying ‘I am going to go to 
	
9 This kind of description can also find a place in the description of human action, as when you say of a 
student heading to college that she is going to fail her classes if she spends four nights a week out drinking. 
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the beach if the weather is sunny’ you describe something that (‘as of now’) you are 
going to do, namely: go to the beach if there is sunny weather. So the phrase ‘going to φ’ 
ranges over the conditional rather than the other way around. The conditionality of 
conditional intentions is different in this way from that of ordinary tendencies. 
Above I claimed that I can’t really say of you, in the case where your intention to 
go to the beach is conditional on the bridge being open and I know that in fact the bridge 
is closed, that you are going to go to the beach if the bridge is open, but only that you 
would be going to do this if it were. (This makes it different from the case where you are 
going to go if it’s sunny, and it’s so far undetermined whether that will be so.) This 
presented a problem for the response we are considering on Clark’s behalf—the response 
that says it’s possible to for someone to be going to do something even when the 
conditions required for doing it aren’t satisfied, because practical tendencies are 
conditional in the same way as intentions, and so in this case you really are going to: go 
to the beach if the bridge is open. But the distinction I’ve just drawn between the 
conditionality of ordinary tendencies and that of conditional intentions suggests another 
reason why the envisioned response won’t work, namely that we seem not to have an 
independent grasp on the relevant notion of ‘being going to (φ if …)’ to draw on in 
explaining what intentions are. According to Clark, an intention is a kind of conative 
state—but then so are desires, preferences, wishes, and hopes, and so we need an account 
of how intentions are different from these. The appeal to the category of ‘tendency’ or 
‘being going to’ seemed to promise a way of doing this: for a person can desire, prefer, 
wish, or hope to do something and not be going to do that thing, and so if intention is 
different in this respect then that helps to specify the kind of conative state that it is. I 
have just argued, however, that it’s only in the special sort of case that Clark is interested 
in—viz., the sort of case that involves the expression or attribution of conditional 
intentions—that the tendency described with the phrase ‘to be going to …’ has the 
internally conditional structure in question. It seems, then, that we need a prior grasp of 
intention in order to understand what it is for someone to be going to: φ on the condition 
that such-and-such. 
Things are different for the strong cognitivist, however. According to the strong 
cognitivist, intention is a cognitive state like belief—and the conditionality of a practical 
belief is no different from that of a theoretical one. Further, the strong cognitivist holds 
that what distinguishes those beliefs about a person’s future that are her intentions from 
those that are mere ‘estimates’ is that intentions are beliefs that are grounded in practical 
reasoning. It is, of course, perfectly legitimate to question whether any of this is 
plausible. But it avoids the kind of circularity that I have argued would come with any 
attempt to use the category of tendency or ‘being going to’, understood as something that 
can be internally conditional, to illuminate the difference between intentions and other 
kinds of conative state. 
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I confess that I am somewhat uncomfortable about leaning as much as I have in 
this section on intuitions about ‘what we would say’ in various hypothetical cases, such 
as the one in which the bridge leading to the beach is closed. Unfortunately, without these 
intuitions the ontological category of ‘tendency’ or ‘being going to’ is quite hard to get a 
handle on. Clark is trying to make good on the idea that, as Anscombe put it, a person 
‘can form an intention which he then does nothing to carry out, either because he is 
prevented or because he changes his mind’ (Anscombe 1963, p. 9), and his proposal is 
that in such a case the person will have been going to do what he nevertheless didn’t. But 
what are we saying, when we say such a thing? A deep difficulty is that from the 
forward-looking perspective, the statement ‘I am going to do such-and-such’ entails that 
this is what I will do—as Anscombe notes very clearly: 
 
Nor can we say: But in an expression of intention one isn’t saying anything is 
going to happen! Otherwise, when I had said ‘I’m just going to get up’, it would 
be unreasonable later to ask ‘Why didn’t you get up?’ I could reply: ‘I wasn’t 
talking about a future happening, so why do you mention such irrelevancies?’ 
(Anscombe 1963, p. 92) 
 
This point applies in turn to statements that attribute an intention to someone else by 
describing their future actions, such as in the case where I say that you are going to go to 
the beach. As we have seen, however, from the backward-looking perspective it is 
possible to say of someone (or something) that she (or it) was going to do such-and-such, 
but never actually went on to do it. Repurposing a phrase that Anscombe borrows from 
Wittgenstein, we may say that when such a statement is used to attribute a past intention, 
its purpose is to reveal something about a person ‘which goes beyond what [actually] 
happened’ (Philosophical Investigations I, §659; quoted in Anscombe 1963, p. 45): it’s a 
statement about what the person then intended, what she then was going to do. And as I 
have emphasized throughout this section, Clark’s position requires us to treat these 
statements as picking out a ‘past future’: not just a way things would have been (except 
…), but a way that they really were going to be. The challenge is to get a firm enough 
handle on this category that we can then use it to explain the nature of intention itself, and 
also to say whether, as Clark supposes, the truth of such a statement is necessary for a 
person to have intended to do the thing in question. In this section I have given reason for 
skepticism on both counts. Intending to do something might, indeed, require having a real 
tendency toward doing it, but that tendency need not be of the sort that’s expressed with 






I have argued, against Clark, that a person can have intended to do something that she 
never was going to do—not because her will was conflicted or liable to change, but 
because the world was so arranged that it never was possible for her to execute her 
intention. In such a case the person’s intention will have been ‘complete’ despite her 
never having been in what Clark calls the ‘state of being going to do’ the thing in 
question, at least if this phrase is understood as attributing a real tendency. And this 
possibility undermines Clark’s defense of noninferential weak cognitivism. 
But we should be wary of overstating this conclusion. From the fact that it is 
possible to intend to do what one isn’t really going to do, it doesn’t follow that intention 
never consists in a real tendency—that it never reaches out to encompass the fact that one 
is, self-consciously and in a way that is grounded in one’s practical reasoning, going to 
do a certain thing. That’s the sort of slide that we see on display in the argument from 
illusion, where the fact that perceptual experience sometimes stops short of the world is 
used to show that it’s never a real relation to it. Such reasoning is invalid until further 
premises are added to it. The same point applies in connection with the present case. 
So the mere fact that it is possible to intend to do something one isn’t going to do 
doesn’t show that intention doesn’t ever consist in a real practical tendency. Indeed, we 
can say more than that: it’s also compatible with this being what intentions are in the 
basic case, i.e., the case that should be central in our analysis of what intention is. And 
this stronger view should seem attractive when we reflect on the way that intention 
appears from within the perspective of first-person deliberation.10 As I explained above, a 
central motivation for the cognitivist position is that from that deliberative perspective the 
superficially self-directed question ‘What do I intend?’ is transparent to the world-
directed question ‘What am I going to do?’: the only way that my present intentions can 
show up for me, at least in a non-alienated way, is in deliberation about my future 
actions. And it’s this perspective that should be treated as central in understanding what 
intention itself is: not a mere desire to do something or a mere judgment that doing it 
would be reasonable or obligatory, but a commitment to carrying it out. If committing 
oneself in this way weren’t, in the fundamental case, a way of making it the case that one 
is going to do the thing one commits to, then practical deliberation would lose its 
rationale. 
But is Clark right in thinking that the belief that one will do something, where this 
belief is grounded in one’s practical reasoning, isn’t itself sufficient for having the sort of 
commitment I’ve just described? In Section II I summarized what I see as Clark’s most 
powerful argument for this anti-cognitivist conclusion: it was that someone who reasons 
practically to the belief that she’s going to do something might nevertheless not intend to 
	
10 I develop this idea further in Schwenkler (2019), pp. 203-210. 
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do it, since it may be that ‘when the chips are down’ the person is not going to follow 
through—and, indeed, that this is what was going to happen all along, notwithstanding 
the agent’s belief to the contrary. Clark concludes from this that while intending to do 
something might entail having a directive belief that you are going to do it, nevertheless 
having this belief isn’t sufficient for intending, and so the belief itself can’t be what 
intention consists in. 
I think we can resist this conclusion by reflecting on the way that beliefs can 
differ in what philosophers have called strength. Consider, for example, the attitude you 
might take toward the question of whether a friend is trustworthy, or whether your 
favorite team is going to win the big game. No matter what you say to others or think to 
yourself, in cases like this if ‘when the chips are down’ you don’t actually trust your 
friend or place your bet on your team, this will be evidence that the belief you had—that 
is, the belief you had that your friend was trustworthy, or that your team was going to 
win—was a weak belief, since you were prepared to act on it only to the extent that there 
wasn’t much hanging on the matter. And this point is sometimes put by saying that your 
eventual behavior reveals that you didn’t really believe what you said after all. That’s 
because if you ‘really had’ believed it, then you’d have been willing to stick by your 
friend, or your team, despite the significant risks incurred by doing so. 
Consider now the case of the person who takes it that she is going to do a certain 
thing, say break off a longstanding affair, though in fact she isn’t really committed to 
doing this. We can easily imagine this person saying she is going to break things off, and 
also thinking to herself that this is what she is going to do, but as we have just seen all 
this isn’t sufficient for her to have a strong belief that she is going to do it. For we have to 
consider further what will happen when it comes time for the person to act her supposed 
commitment, either by breaking things off directly or doing something else whose 
rationality is contingent on her eventually doing this, such as declining to buy expensive 
tickets for a getaway. It is in situations like these that ‘the chips are down’: and if we 
imagine that in such a situation the person comes to the realization that she (perhaps) 
isn’t going to break off the affair after all (so that, say, she goes ahead and buys the 
tickets), how are we to understand this realization? 
In principle there are two possibilities. First, it might be that the person really did 
believe that she was going to break it off, right up until the crucial moment—and then 
came to believe instead that she was going to continue the affair. But how is this 
transition supposed to have happened? It is not as if the person changed her mind because 
of evidence that showed that she wasn’t going to do what she thought she would—as 
when I think I am going to be somewhere at 5:15 and then come to see that the traffic is 
too heavy for that. Nor did she decide not to follow through after recognizing apparent 
reasons in favor of continuing the affair, or against breaking it off—for as we are 
imagining the case it was true all along that this is what she was going to do, and so the 
crucial moment was not one that brought about a change in her intentions. On the present 
  15
interpretation what seems instead to happen is that, as of the crucial moment, the person 
simply thinks, and believes, that ‘I am not going to break this off’. And the fact that she is 
able simply to think this gives us reason to say that she didn’t really (strongly) believe 
anything different beforehand, and that the truth about herself was just too uncomfortable 
for her to admit. 
So here is the better interpretation of the case. A person who takes herself to have 
decided to do a certain thing that she isn’t really going to do—not because she’s going to 
forget or be unable to do it or because something will happen to change her mind, but 
because she isn’t really (strongly) committed to doing it after all—also doesn’t really 
(strongly) believe that she is going to do this thing, even as she may tell herself inwardly 
something different. In addition to helping us understand what changes in such a person 
when the chips are finally down (that is, that the change is a matter of coming to realize 
what she is (and always was) going to do, in the face of circumstances that make this 
situation clear), this interpretation of the case also makes good sense of the way that, on 
Clark’s view as well as Marušić and my own, directive beliefs about what one is going to 
do are grounded in practical reasoning rather than in evidence about one’s future 
behavior. The person who judges, say, that she is going to break off a longstanding affair, 
will hold this belief in light of considerations that favor doing just that, rather than 
considerations that show it likely that this will happen. And what happens when the chips 
are down is not that this person recognizes new reasons to continue the affair, or sees that 
her reasons for deciding to break it off were insufficient. Rather, what happens is that she 
continues to see breaking off the affair as favored in just the same way, and to just the 
same degree, as she had seen it as favored before, only now she realizes that she is not, in 
fact, actually going to break it off for these reasons. This suggests that the belief she 
previously had, on those grounds, that she was going to break the affair off was a weak 
belief. If the belief had been stronger, she wouldn’t have given it up so easily when the 
time came to put it into action. Her belief was precisely as weak as her intention was—
just as the strong cognitivist would have it. 
This response to Clark’s argument recalls the one that Marušić and I put forward 
in response to a similar objection in our original paper. There, we criticized the idea ‘that 
belief is purely intellectual and dispassionate, that the criteria for belief cannot require 
commitment and motivation, and that what a person believes floats free of how things are 
with her “deep self”” (Marušić and Schwenkler 2018, p. 334). What we failed to 
emphasize, however, is that matters like these are relevant not just to the presence of a 
belief but also to what we called its strength. The argument I’ve just given hinges on the 
idea that having a strong belief that p requires having a stable, rationally grounded 
commitment to act on the truth of p even ‘when the chips are down’ and there are 
temptations to do otherwise. A person who is committed in this way to the truth of the 
judgment that she’ll do a certain thing is committed to acting in the way that she believes 
she will. To the extent that her commitment is strong and stable, this is exactly how she is 
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going to act. Unless she is going to fail, be prevented, or have something happen that 
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